

8 July 89

Learning from Experience

vs. Anti-Learning Mechanisms

Fear of Learning (Investigation)

Anti-Heretics - Being Not to Discover  
but to Cover, Mis-learn

Protect / Preserve One's Tradition,  
Institution - Personal - created  
Memory, Understanding

Homeostasis of Memory, Understanding  
Lessons, Conceptualization

If you investigate you find past

- Errors, misunderstanding,

- False expectations

- Crisis

- lies (can when discovering an  
reasoning - if were lied about  
at the time

- to pressure bluff

- to protect future bluffs

- keep from hitting K

(create need for revenge,  
or back-off from deal)

- to defend against hands  
JFK

- missed opportunities (REGRET)

(If a failure, you want to investigate - to control/manage REGRET)

Rebroad



13,000,000,000  
13 BT  
13,000,000

Regret



In last section:

- Ironia that JFK/McN, who were  
so concerned about loss of control, should  
ignore pers. of loss of their control of  
SAMS or AA.

- Yet, despite fining of AA + SAMS  
(whether of K's loss of control of himself!  
or of others)

JFK ("weakly" - backing down to subordinates)  
(see harassment of Quinn - massive before  
Dumars)

rejected K offer of 27 Oct -

(and before RFK ult.)

Hours after fining had command, with  
back was dead -

JFK tried one more threat (weak offer)

K waited to see if JFK would accept  
his last offer (as he right here).

- even though both saw risks
- and both were prepared to deal
- rather than go to war

Yet had acted as if, <sup>either!</sup> he could certainly  
avoid war, if he persisted

or: if he was willing to risk war, to have a  
chance at a better outcome, to postpone an  
unpleasant outcome

[cf. CBU ~ 1965; No Ch. Mind?!]



First section: risks accepted (already)

what if AA → US } Wife PER about...  
Shostakov → US } (Hand operations)  
response: What then?

~~Mid-section~~

Mid-section: <sup>possibly</sup> challenges to critique JFK (or SU?)  
or to call JFK officials (or oneself) (or Castro?)  
bans: to discuss the testimony...

example: (new info): discussion of Cuba

Bolt (like in data) born in: Why a crisis?

Why did K...

Why did JFK...

What was his strategy (i.e. timing)  
(Why did K think he could get away with it?)

(Answer: Could one crisis again?)

Now mention: to start context  
to personalities  
(K; JFK...)





MBG

Check PAL book on line

Mike McColley - Playhouse

5624 S. Danderton  
Caring 60637

1-800-238-5355 and Fed Ex Airtel No.

Control no. - expedite from Albany Airport

062-901-99-91

and to MBG

Wg and always doing a cliffhanger  
making deadline

if up the odds

and MBG drafts, Betts...

Wisconsin tapes - April?

Oxford  
to Telegraph  
left - Dwyer  
to College

add: Wm CZ is interesting

R/NATO strategy is:


FU by persons or territories

only shifts credible

"mechan"


see Betts

add: K...  
013-781-1900  
Al Howard  
62 Congress St.  
Humboldt Mass. 01301  
773-9810 R





CH + SNF



1) McN feared loss of control by Sovs.

2) Why? because he already knew of poss. of  
of US loss of control

DE reports  
Delegation  
BNSP → DALS

unsuccessful

(Cuba I)

(Even before - Cuba II)

VN

3) Therefore, he was deterred ("K succeeded"!)!

had an effect he wanted

just, by the way K did it, and the context + timing,

K gave new incentives

(a) - to attack

and prior to, or instead of, that

(b) - to threaten, bluff, posture

(+ trade!)

4) McN/VFK chose (b) - BLUFF. (Perhaps the result of  
the crisis - all knew VFK wanted to trade - and some knew he was about to,  
when K quit. (Did VFK feel he had stolen a victory: like N in 1972 (Muskie, Wallace, "Piers")?  
VFK guilty, "not worthy"? ) So, "NO risk" ? (as Mcb, etc. concluded)  
Subject

5) Wrong! Despite their appropriate fear of US + SU  
loss of control, they took risks

near

blockade

increasing control, e.g. to respond to shooting  
of near;

RFK's 2 ultimatums

to get mines removed

6) K did lose control (of Castro, AA); SAM! (to avoid going up (RBMs,  
here, VFK delay)

As did JFK/McN!

SAC; USAF; Navy ASW; Mongoose...

WHAT McN FEARED ON NUC UA, DID OCCUR WITH SAM! (Things he didn't fear it!)

7) JFK postponed ambitious trade, for at least 24 hours...

HIS BLUFF ALMOST EXPLODED

Delegation, DALS  
SEE SNF, GERMANY



K ~~was~~ threatened loss of control (perhaps only threat  
that is credible to leaders: not "mad")

But the threat was not a bluff: loss. was real

Get <sup>despite</sup> ~~the~~ threats, + fears...  
with backed down quickly, indicated,  
each implied that with would be enter

(K died; and in hours more,  
VFK right here, too!

So K seized control at cost  
of conceding, defeat —

He could no longer

"manage the crisis"

("win the forest-fire")

so as to postpone or avert  
defeat;

he could only end it.

If he had delayed this...

---

Does VFK, too, fat. right, discussed poss. of  
losing control (threat — unless K conceded!  
and arranged to do it, by flor's recon  
("if fired on...")

They feared loss of control



# 1. Initial reaction

Myth:

ExCom was group decision-making at its best,  
leading the Pres <sup>Adm, Dillon</sup> ~~the~~ away from  
an strike to

blockade, → airstrike, invasion

(McN, son don't mention, Trade  
(or Pres intent w/ it!)

about

2. All-exp. Pres - rejected trade, as reasonable

McN

McN + many others regarded it as inevitable  
Pres thought it fair, acceptable, better than  
airstrike, and the probable outcome.

Pres.

3 Strategy: Blockade, bluff of airstrike, trade

(not from ExCom: from 2d or 3d day, on his own + McN (RFK, O'Donnell  
Buse?))

Success prior to Trade was unexpected\*

4. Ended ~~with~~ because K had lost control of crisis,  
willing to sue, (not just because of ult - which was a bluff,  
Charles goal as K could have hoped or guessed...)

Could sue sue by conceding,  
not by counter-threats, underlying  
("give me time...")

1) threat of war (plausible)  
and retal

was the effective threat

2) (also leak - rejection, like RFK, of  
public trade.

but (1) meant, no time to test this.

NO

\*Totally? Were threats only to reassure banks,  
or - "Are if K is bluffing..." and scan public & allies into  
(Maybe hopful on Wed: not Thurs; maybe Fri night (as I was)



to NATO "threat of loss of control"

possibly effective? Yes  
without signif. risk? No

loss of Sov control in East Germany;  
can public

over East Germany troops  
(= Cuban)

loss of US control over West Germany  
+ loss of SU deterrence /

loss of US deterrence over Sov troops;  
and loss of Sov "freedom" of action;

on basis of plans, facts, prior contacts,  
inst. pressures,

"G can't help from sending  
Sov troops into West Germany."

It is irresponsible, reckless, unacceptable of Sovs + NATO  
to put the trigger to WWII in hands of oppressed  
East Germans

Both/all need to work to defuse this: not to  
arrest an unusual invasion threat by arms that could  
blow up in event of a possible border conflict.\*

As it was irresponsible ... of K to deal with  
real problem of US invasion by "mining" Cuba,  
wing it to explode in event of a war it  
could not reliably prevent.

\* Both sides should plan to prevent non-arm esp;  
and SU, to make uprising unwarranted by  
(1) eliminating trigger  
(2) eliminating need to push thing, or tell others,  
degrees measures to protect against it.

Lessons: - Why Sov is longer to strategy (Can work  
- Degrees of strategy: it can fail, not. Weapons do matter)  
Alternatives must be found + chosen. recognized.



What can readers guess about each other?

1) Nature of "weakness" — pressure, temptation to yield  
(to charges of "weakness" w/out  
enough, or violence, or  
law-breaking, massacre, risk)

Pressure of nobility  
intell

"tough guys"

2) "Dantean politics" nature, role

3) Ability to keep secrets, lie (K w/out JFK: but, error)

4)



① I was a patient...



CII - Invasion + McN/McG

McG + McN disclaimers of "any intention"  
to invade

or of the resemblance/analogy of  
a Soviet "contingent" or "high expectation" of  
invasion

are like similar disclaimers about  
intention to invade VN, with with  
100,000 troops (spring '65)  
or 500,000 troops

as of, say, fall 1964;

or to launch an attack,  
as of early 1964,  
or late 1964

[or - to invade Cuba, as of Oct 22-27:

"would McN/McG say, "no intent"?

("no decision")

("would contingency planning"?)

Now about, for air strikes, in spring '64?

fall '64?

etc.

(There really was no "intent" to send  
500,000 - yet that was a good prediction,  
an "contingency" = Ball, French, VN etc...

and on RMN, 1967-69 or else.

hinks, thinks - but no desire  
no expectation

many plans  
of eventual  
invasion

(Prediction could be valid  
even without hinks or thinks. desire, expectation, contingency



CTI as TMI, Challenge

Lat  
1 July 89

Not just what happened

or why? (The Story  
The Motives)

But what could have happened

Must resist to this;

But unlike WWI - close to many possible  
disaster

which, however, could be  
repeated

"Counter-factual" / hypothetical

It's the only case we have, of a very  
near-miss (involving SU

where, confrontation of tanks in  
Berlin '61.

So, like Wahrlich, upstage choices, possibly,  
opportunity (for change, acting differently  
so as to learn, to change

Not, to grade actors (Why did the best they  
could - at the time, in the situation

But, were there "deeply embedded" tendencies  
or...

Compare Harbocher's moves to Khrushchev's

Though there was great similarity of  
motives!



K, in '63, "could have" accepted JFK's offer of  
5-6 (?) inspiration, for CTB

What did he really have to lose?

He could have preserved our control —  
by US down, instead of SU up!

(God knows, we believed SU alligned to  
go up!)

in avoided SU bindup

and what was the parable "What you  
did to us"?

Even the relation to Cuba didn't change.

China's <sup>relation</sup> was already bad — so what?

How much did SU and TW?

Which was more important — to avoid  
Bryant bind-up in Europe? Come on!

(Was NATO planning, in <sup>late</sup> ~~mid~~-60's,  
to return in East Germany?)

(Note: just as AWW recognizes 2) false alarm problem  
(b) proportion problem (Jews, proportion) c) East German  
uprising problem

and the policy to renewed means that will  
make the less likely (violently restraint on  
US FS cap (TCS-MHH

so Ours-Mys in FA, and B in late-60's, <sup>not information</sup>  
our uprising - interaction problem, and looks only to  
determine to solve it, which is that not, determine is unachievable



(Don't try to distill a crystal, desperate,  
nationalist, military, personal with  
personal intentions

and "loss of national integrity, honor,"  
loss of character of nations...

(Japan in 1940-41)

Deng Xihou - Ping

With (let his guards? or not?)

Norinaga

Ho Chi Minh

Hemster - I am really is something on both  
sides of argument

- some common

reasons

reasonable / sound / understandable

notes

SOME "BAD" ON EACH SIDE

and - mis-understanding (on early side)

- mistaken, unrealistic, personal, political  
egoistic...

...

Note that both sides are equally reasonable,  
"nearly equivalent," etc.

first that the model or proposition that  
one side is totally lacking in "sense," or good  
intentions...

is almost always unrealistic, wrong -  
and may be definitely strongly against evidence  
to contrary, which may be important...

(and mistakes "humanity" of "every" chain of repetition...



K was less crazy, reckless,  
unpredictable, ungraceful  
than he has been seen.

The fact he won't predict shows more  
about defects in our intelligence, efforts ... than  
to be able to acknowledge

Our failure to predict

- K's lack of insights
- fall of Shah
- Deng's reactions
- Mao's reactions

} There was a  
Pres who knew  
both men personally;  
who was Ambassador to  
China and head  
of CIA.

Lies as an ability to know politics  
of opponents or allies! :

"Cornea" of NVN Politics

in context of ... US news edition  
in NSSM-1 (annexes!)

Check the in VN

"features" in Politics

(In general, do we analyze "situations  
in which detour / cornea is likely to fail"?)

(in Capital Punishment  
Crime / retribution  
Addiction

} TCS?



Could have been:

- (i) — K would have won if Castro hadn't started firing. (VFR breakdown on Sunday!) — if ~~if~~ he didn't (and/or if Gov hadn't fired?) <sup>but don't argue, on Sunday.</sup>  
ask Lewis What did K do to prevent 2d SAM firing?

ask Lewis: — Did K hope VFR would keep quiet about U-2 — as she did?!

"This time, I would shoot U-2 — or shoot it down?"

Is that why SAMs didn't go first — they would to shoot any U-2, but to protect MRBMs (No?)

What would they for?

Prove and delay U-2! Field mission was strong!

Yes, with delay.

R win (2) What if, delayed till 1 week before election?

McG est. <sup>RA</sup> (VFR did not on evidence of photos of minors <sup>and</sup> (longer, an agent-evidence; did about it!)  
Keating — French?  
McCom

+ scale / VFR negotiation of deal  
3) Yet, if RFR ult. (bluff — VFR ally to make it) + negotiation, and no reason by US (no fear by VFR of being and forced...)

and/or no firing by Castro,  
K would have backed down Sunday or Monday,  
in face of "negotiation" of deal  
i.e. Bluff/ult/negotiation might have worked even without



Castro/U-2 firing her

- his US win was not guaranteed sign of  
US superiority — as B, and US forces, behind

(see — "McN's law")  
- his prop determine of win of Cuba  
(see how even about that, for him)

- and fear of real,

though small,

chance of SU EU

or — retal elsewhere

— ESC — up to US EU

SU second — un...

McG B/McN assess of "effort posit,  
"no rep"

does not expl / posit SU<sup>B</sup> behavior  
after crisis

but it does critic it, as unneces,  
useful

unless / do not

(can ap for US response, with Castro / Prager  
or MIRVing with McW, N)

and this is correct; SU reaction was  
understandable, like ours, int best  
assess — but wrong!

McG/McN mean to predict K roughly at end of  
crisis — his "suprising" (to the) capitulation —  
but not only — it was Castro who forced  
his hand.



Why was CII not investigated like TMI

(or, Challenge WWI (Age)

Chambers

Fall of China - Exxon - Volody

Paul Walker

Korea '50-51

CIA / assess (Chuck Condit)

WG: ICG!

VN was not, either?

1. Not run as failure! → NO Admin investigation

a "success"

NO Hearings!

NO TRIALS

(No rush to learn from success;

you just learn lessons that will  
any but those getting credit from success  
- who are the still in power!

and can block insight.

or - from point of view of needs - risky  
strength the practice.

find out it was lucky

learned a lesson

occasionally of errors

over - loss - of nerve

a over - the

Thus, reasons to change leadership...

2. And/then, not followed by shift in Admin,  
as a Congress controlled by other party.

(thus, no VN hearings - since Dems had

Congress after '69, (?) and N didn't want to change  
policy (didn't want PP, in 1969, in 1971...!)



3. Survey - natural setting.

4. 2-3 parties involved; adversaries  
who were ~~in~~ more secretive  
(but this is nat. sec. cases above)

5. Early <sup>disclosure</sup> ~~occurs~~, only by interested participants

6. Unlike TMI, Challenge (?):  
W4 involved..



Connections: CII

1 Aug 89

- I helped course CII... (to extract lessons learned;  
and understanding a mission  
(Buen, Helicopter)
- Berlin (Relations of West & East Germany, empires,  
Wall, still a issue).
- Pers. of US RU, arising an Berlin  
either uprising  
NATO RU feeling or SC blockade  
(K wouldn't intend to  
go that far;  
but one - tanks  
- SAM firing  
(- KAL...)
- German was, as issue. (Ullow, Interlocking)  
See Northeast plan  
Strasbourg: German but US was  
(Wg SC unhappy - then or now  
on German was are but had -  
given German was.  
NAR, MCF  
(see Castro + SAMS / MRBMs / Il-28s)
- Dolzeta issue; Korea; Japanese  
(Archie: accidents; being - looseness).
- STOP Downing Marine - on hair - trigger,  
under to UA (Dr. Stragelove), error...



CE shows both sides

Blyth

- Dampening attitudes at top, despite rhetoric, threats, posing; public, detention,
- awareness of loss of central style public
- Willingness to risk
- willingness to trade, if necessary
- (Loss & losing is crisis, then Blyth responds; but more caution from beginning, willingness to deal - fruit, in admission; then Pros...

- BUT: - Willingness to risk - at start and on Oct 27 ANYWAY
- Underestimate of loss of central, "already" and, in apparent, already
  - In some, underestimate of public of winning Center. (Not, Nitza, Taylor...?)
  - Real poss. of breakdown, despite center (i.e. with no change in attitudes of Pros, K...)

- Entire features

- (Blyth - early, late, is reversed about importance of Pros change of war and (unful) role of war: "and the" (a balance!) forming leads or risk... losing is crisis, if very thin (but no risk on Oct 27! late...)
- (ignores Mogensen...)



Explan:

NATO FU policy

K was initiating, upholding

H N

Wf?

NNN

Wf?

Compare to US FU attitude Europe?

NNN I

Wf does unilateral force permit, - size of rules?

P II

N- base

carries

state of install

SNF

(see Bitts in FA)

MX

all require effective delegation

(not PACS)

FA Owens

How is extended det appropriate  
to problem of central Europe?

by G changes doctrine?

See SALS Statement

300,000 US troops - tripwire

not just loss  
of control;

ALSO (see 40,000 SU troops)

"protect troops

(authorised action  
etc)

which was  
not used  
as deterrent!

Wf not?

warheads!

If Cuba would would war to SU -

wf troops? warheads

Like Downey  
Machin in Strasbourg!

otherwise, WARHEADS!

What would they have done, if invasion?

Now was Castro AA

used as deterrent!


[Or, Pakistani decision? - do anything  
to prevent invasion!]

or - hardly on SSMs  
to CUBA.

- actual JFK choice on let. Oct 27 -  
actual JFK decision (high alert)

- Role of Superiority [Views of ExCom: all crazy in some way]





MBC - Sponsor Wants...

What is the best chance of dealing the CW,  
so there will be peace in the world?

Psych aspects:

e.g. role of JFK I II III

active Buddhist

dealing of actions

James Blight book, pub. next month

From & Learning - The Shattered Crystal Ball

Out of Contact:

with Hist. & ...

Wilek + Bruce Allen

Origins of CII

MBC

Send best screenshot of program for  
SU and control.

SIKH

Call

(Cautious)

Interview



not realizing that K had lost control!

## My Lessons/Revelations

\*  
#

1. First reactions; need to "accept."

"Crisis" began w/ Pros (first) reaction.

\*  
#

2. End: How it ended. Note Butthoff: quotes me. Loss of control...

5. Role of Castro (Third person. See Land/US, 1973...)

\*  
#

3. What K hoped? not crazy

(Time, 1976)

in US Security: PSALM

\*  
#

4. Risks that ExCom/Pros saw — and accepted.

\* — JFK ready to travel early, and — Sat Oct 26 —  
BUT DELAYED, GAMBLEO!

News: \* — US missile preparations / Magnum

\* — Have K-school known way: SC not  
"mistake"

\* — Motivation of SC INF — like US INF, SNF

FO Threat (Could arise again —

Threat of Loss of Control

if G pressed, or replaced,  
in corner of uprising!

\* — (This about about — tell now, & still

— Q — Deterrent effect of INF on VFK, MCN

\* — Tink missiles — April

\* — "De-fusing" flex

\* — ExCom as Big stone

\* — JFK Strategy: Bluff (MCN); yet  
what have been carried out!

[US the Posture: A BLUFF THAT MAY EXPLODE

A bluff, and a threat of immediate/real  
action... mistake

unknown to,  
\* — ignored,  
with-rational  
a misinterpreted  
& slight!

AT START, NOT  
CAS BLIGHT INFERS,  
FROM OFFER OF  
SECRET TRADG)  
AT END!



(Not all supplies create crises:

- Fall of Shah
- Discovery of man
- Suppression
- Harlem confrontation
- " proposal/man of Dec '88 - Jan '89

Coming: Lebanon

Blyat, et al II (Moscow)

Nat. Sec. Archives (?)

SU articles cited by Gantshoff

Nash

(my notebooks; notes, etc....)

more ExCom topics ?!

More on Oct planning? (Hendley)

- Cuba Conference!

- Studies by Mikoyan; other issues?

(relation to SNF: issue (Korean politics)  
history

Control issue: "Planned loss of control

Construction of institute

Delegation

Anticipating bluffs?! Gantshoff 19

- Fears of loss of control (by JFK - things not <sup>soon</sup> enough!  
by K: as right happen with  
NATO or one of its members, or US - if one  
member - loss of control as threat, then  
confront it - crisis!

(Will we "concede" ("surrender")

fast enough? K did - JFK you not have,



Jan 89

Jan 21-89

CTI: New info invalidates previous "lessons" —  
are relevant ones (Blight) —

These, <sup>new</sup> lessons must be tentative  
yet, currently <sup>emerging</sup> plausible lessons make CTI  
look more relevant to today and next decade  
than appeared 10 years ago  
(or, say, to Dillon in 1987)

Like Benthoff, I am in a <sup>about-</sup> unique position...  
(participant, student (th), student (now) <sup>more broadly</sup>)  
main — historical analysis — interpretation

CTI as the best precursor / warning of a breakdown:  
Have we not seen...

(1973? 1980)

It was more "typical, normal" in its charts  
than admitted or recognized:

{ less "crazy, aberrant" on SU scale <sup>see Kas "reform"</sup>  
less related to SC effort at "strat. change"  
than supposed. — more to SC and to  
maintain a friendly regime

SC minutes - Cuba = <sup>or INF</sup> SNF in Europe

Function; <sup>det.</sup> effort; danger

Benthoff 12: SC minutes = PI

- Issue of FA: Crisis Pattern (for future, too:  
incentives for, dangers of, other part FA  
~~with~~ note appreciation of statement, &  
many dangers not

These, crises as surprises

(It's an crisis because surprises, in part;  
not other threats, that make the crises,  
come as surprises).



CT as "Kissin" —

Those unable to criticize either one or the  
oth, US or SU (or Castro!) will miss much!

'JFK...

or, to appreciate one or the oth...

All actors could have done worse  
or difficult  
better...

The worst was avoided;  
yet, not by much,  
in time or "manner"  
not with great assurance

Caution, prudence

and recklessness, irresponsibility, glibbing...

Control (of leaders)

and ignorance and loss of control...

Those who want only to reassure about  
CW, or as rule, or point of rep.,  
or threats, or panic...

SU "threat": defense of the Empire, i.e. East Europe  
which is then is (a) "threatened" by Germany  
and (b) part of the defense against  
Germany.

(yet which poses, i.e. the process, a threat to  
Germany & West Europe; <sup>("real")</sup> a threat to

Problem: How to make under claim of "crisis" if more  
oth the making it possible or likely that crisis  
will "explode"?!



Monday, June 12, 1989

in the WPI Statement

Both doves and hawks refrain from asserting that the nuclear arms race involves risks, as well as costs ~~for~~ and wastes (and advantages). Neither claim that current nuclear postures involve significant risk of too war or of all-out nuclear war; nor that current programs on both sides might eventually increase those risks.

Perhaps the "doves" — the arms reducers — generally do not believe in such risks — or more than the hawks, or the majority of the public!

I do. I believe the risks of large-scale war, still more the risks of too war, are not zero. ~~Reality~~ (No one, perhaps, would disagree with that.) But with our "infinite". If an out, mostly, "negligible."

If an out, in other words, what experts used to claim was the risk of a full mutual is a nuclear reaction. ("10-14")

If an, at a minimum, more like what the risks of a mutual have really been. And the risk of a unilateral US use of too war has been closer to the real probability of a TMI or Chernobyl.

(or an Enkai Volody, or Polish Bhopal...)

And this is true for many of the same reasons that



been under-estimated,

To understand current risks, it is helpful to look at past, hidden, history — despite the way real changes that have occurred.

It is a history of man-misuses, and of attitudes and weaknesses, plus & perks and (in the case) thinks that one of party bluffs

It is a history of reckless choices and human error; when "human error" includes "errors" of high officials and planners, in boardrooms and in crisis, as well as by value-turners...

"Accidents" can be well-planned and long-foreseen... even when they can, to say, as spins...

Case (WWI); Challenger; escalation in VN....



1989  
9 July Sunday

Dept of Defense

Why was there a crisis?

Because JFK forced unpleasant, at hands of K

He had been defied: by Castro  
+ K

JFK had explained ("you said...")  
predicted  
warned  
promised (to "act")

made a fool of — if he didn't  
+ command unmanly act violently (illegal)  
+ with risk

thinks to act with "worth while"

if you can count on action being  
restrained by law, morality, risk

if that is of non-violence,  
it may be "worth while"

is influencing the one threatened

but it isn't worth while

(M-) establishing one's manliness

(or non-violence),  
unmanly tendencies  
(even if, actually, painful)

vs. MRBMs

JFK had warned — as a manly substitute for  
acting violently in face of SU SAMs + gear

though MRBMs were no better a justification for  
violence (more dangerous!) than 3rd SU response:

vs. an authentic

(Dignity, Manly Image

Honor; calm — and

for — inspiring

command presence)

— defines, vs. our wills

— drives an right to invade

— asserts unshakable sovereign

legit. rights to seek support

— asserts SU right to join

support — "in our hemisphere

— challenges our strength, will,

in our hemisphere

— Honor, perhaps for + users of  
chall. elsewhere — in Berlin



McG:

"Crisis-risk was small"

|| Really, because K was sure to back down?

|| No: Because if K didn't back down, JFK would.

- Before there was more violence,  
forcing the hands, to respond  
violently

(A "man" can respond to first violent  
challenge with a warning + commitment  
(maybe to 2d), ~~if~~ first  
But not with a sequence of warnings as  
responses to violence  
(Paper Tiger)

But the process (of deciding to back down)

takes time; ~~more~~

when a gun is out on you (or your family)  
but on hostages (or still is hostage)

- ~~you~~ <sup>HC</sup> can't be certain you will get first -

show nerve - temporize -

make counter-threats, act to make the  
credible, and wait for him to give way...

Memorize - i.e. of first, short interval -  
the time is unreliable, not certain to  
bring a first-except response.

There usually was time enough to try  
alternatives to backing down, or to give those alternatives  
a chance to work...  
Time



McG's ~~point~~ is like saying:

(LBJ) There was no risk of a 500,000 man  
US stalemate in VN, because with Ho would  
break down before that point, or LBJ would.

(a difference:

VN was not like Cuba, which was (not (?)

~~like~~

like Berlin Zone.

or Berlin Cruising...

Difference between violence - and - threats (VN)  
as -

and <sup>NV-</sup> threats of violence (Cuba)  
Berlin

To back down is fear of <sup>NV-</sup> threats of violence

is less commonly, embarrassing; <sup>less</sup> more likely

than to back down after (repeated, increased -  
definite  
violence. (many)

Yes, RFK's warning on Vietnam & escalation was  
credible, no bluff; "went without saying"

(except for see - all SAMs

+ thing - immediate

"Good Doctor" in 1964: We can back down later (than now)  
- with less <sup>major</sup> ~~loss~~ of honorability ("reluctant")

after being urged, with some inevitable compromise,  
[P] eventually, risk-taking - even if we fail and the  
make a deal. LIKE SADAT'S ATTACK IN 1973: RESTORED HONOR.

[Problem: Can't spell out, "in front of the women" - entire  
essence of "what a man's gotta do," what constitutes manliness.  
Batman letter



Incentive to start cycle of violence\*: "the first strike"  
(for disavowal) JFK

But that works better for someone who is  
an underdog with limited resources

- a Terrorist (weak) (limited)

or - Soviet vs. Soviet (US)

then for US, which can go on, escalate...

Hard for a rich man, or state machine,  
to turn off life-support, day long operation  
(the financial abilities level of socialized  
medicine?)

\* For JFK, advisors ~ 1961, VN  
didn't look violent: as committing  
as troops, shooting

just as for McN, blockade, <sup>'62</sup> and off <sup>big shot</sup> smell

and ~ '65, RT didn't look as committing to McN + McN as troops. BUT...  
didn't look violent

though both could (initially) pass for  
(many) "action" - in front of US public

(EX Com didn't see, What will sons think  
'action' means?)

Calling? LA?

- in response to (NV) defence

when warning / prep for violent  
self-defence.

(K was totally the truth - a proving man for  
defence (distance) (retal for aggression)

(though could be used for FS)  
to hit US...

like (in both respects) SU took

in East Germany - for defence

(on US Deep Strike missiles + plans -



The risk is CI

was only in ~~small~~ part  
after RFK warning on neon

till K could back down, JFK got message...  
or Castro hits neon

K was likely to back down, soon, after RFK talk, giving  
Bigger potential of risk Castro firing

(Not knowing of Castro firing, Acheson thought  
K's prompt backdown unnecessary, "lost his nerve")

Ach. thought K wouldn't back down till  
after Cuban attack, missed, and SC had  
hit Turkish missiles... also willing to risk UA with SSM  
(Very wrong of Acheson)  
or Nitzsche - who tried to agree  
to recomm missile...

But Castro's firing - and JFK's reading of  
neon is signifier of this, thinking he had done  
all he could to stop K (would probably work,  
and if not, with <sup>JFK</sup> backdown was  
necessary, or showdown was  
necessary (?))

and risk of neon being shot on body looked  
low enough to make it not unthinkable to defy JCS  
& look unwilling to thru...

want that JFK would be confronted with  
more violence, to which he (big work!) would  
have to respond hard & fast... probably out of control  
(Acheson route)  
(K wasn't as eager for  
that...)



So, after 8PM last night, K was likely to  
back down (as he was likely —

not because he feared "a strong  
"strength" and "will" (without demonstration of  
violence)

If C. didn't find, prob. K would have  
been injured, and JFK backed down.

McC: Eth was, no risk.

But: some risk Sunday morning (or, with  
new plans).

But high period of risk:

(A) From shooting of SAM  
and of AA Sat. morning.

Eth or both "should" / could have backed  
down then; prob. both wanted to (JFK did)  
but "could" continued (so as not to appear  
wrong — to counter charges (after not responding  
to new shootdown).

[I target, a diel USAF, "He's backing —  
he's going to throw" (correctly — but he did  
("and he didn't have to"; try one more throw)

[If you're ready to surrender —  
you have nothing to lose, is right,  
and all is in my or my or my, by trying  
one last bluff. No wave to surrender  
after that than before it: <sup>caught</sup> for 2 bluffs  
instead of one."



Rule (not explicitly understood)

Weaker side doesn't back down after  
violence is used ("bluff" is called) as reliably  
as ~~the~~ before it, when threat (or, very measured,  
small violence?)

or, more reliably than before V;

V puts up resistance, esp. in young males

See Antipode

REAL RISK

not in y  
of end  
line

A: Both kept going\* — from 8 AM Sat to 8 PM —  
hoping for other to "sneak" out's writing the  
10/10

\*Then were the risky choices

(B) Earl — riding a period like A evening  
either lack of control  
or voluntary recklessness.

RFK Ult. was not so risky as I thought — in  
that it was a bluff, and would not have  
been carried out.

(But see Sorensen; assuming K was tough  
enough to have started fighting — he was tough  
enough not to give in quickly, and right keep fighting;  
even if he didn't, JFK was under mounting pressure  
not to give in — hence, to escalate.



JFK/ExCom would not have been planning  
response in SAMs / guns to an AA attack  
— or sending recon (unless a hard bluff,  
wanting to demonstrate  
violence to K:?)

if they had known Castro controlled.

If were trying to control risks — but  
acting in ignorance, threatening wrong party.

If they had hit SAMs — could K accept  
truth, without response?

(Perhaps yes — Putsch  
didn't start war.)

Who has backed down from (his own pursuit of)  
actual violence, without defeat?

Not, (A)  
RMN

(1 excludes Mexico — France  
2, Emperor 5 '45)

de Gaulle, Algeria

Khrushchev, Africa

VN, in Cambodia

(Begin in Lebanon — under domestic pressure

(Rogers, Lebanon)

(Baker, AA AA)



Liberty & Nationalism

8 pg 89

the difficulty of "giving up Jerusalem" (today's Evening)

Asking Poles to "renounce claims," acknowledge  
Jewish claim to (part of) Palestine

is like asking SVN, or NVN

Taiwan or China

SK or NK

How to accept division as final

to renounce feeling that this nation is  
one, and that other state is illegitimate;

2-state solution in divided nations

have not required that

<sup>to be legit. authority in</sup>  
each claim all of individual nation.

(to renounce violent solution?

okay?)



Identity & Nationalism

8 Feb 89

the difficulty of "giving up Jerusalem" (today's Evening)

asking Pals to "renounce claims," acknowledge  
Israeli claim to (part of) Palestine

is like asking SVN, or NVN

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to renounce feeling that this nation is  
one, and that other state is illegitimate;

2-state solution is divided nations

have not agreed that

<sup>to be legit. authority in</sup>  
each claims all of individual nation...

(to renounce violent solution?

okay?)



Was not JFK more controlled after RFK was  
wary?

Note in front of JCS - he didn't tell the

(LBJ suggestion, or wrong?  
or, McCone?)

Not in front of K - if he was going to break down a  
negotiation of deal, that would be ~~the~~ ~~the~~  
~~under the~~ dominate K's impression; whether  
he final break at 5PM, or not;  
(what does final, and make a deal!)

McG front?

(McG? if near shot, JFK could have  
hit a SAM, or my SAMs, and still made  
a deal

→ rather than attack SSMs or invade

But was an "thing" enough to do that, <sup>in face of JCS, Rumsfeld</sup> after  
violence started, involving US (not, allies)

(He ~~didn't~~ won't tested on this —  
in Cuba I, Bure, Laos, or VN '61-63

Now was K

as well as; LBJ, McN, McG, T, Nite, WPB, JTM

AND JFK MIGHT HAVE BEEN TESTED, IF AA NIT RECD, NR NIT SAMS,  
K NIT... <sup>ANOTHER</sup>

[Minsky-like North - <sup>standard</sup> examples and judges of ironies]

Byron, me, Rudy, Harris, (Paul Benjamin):

a diffcult model of manliness  
or, courage



McG/McN? are confident (?) JFK could/would  
have made a deal - banked down -  
after losing more than one near plane

(with or without retal in SAMs;

could be really "joints" to JCS & public,  
hitting SAMs (barrs!) without hitting SSMs?  
+ AA

Public & JCS didn't know <sup>launch for</sup> (UA) hitting SSMs

JFK/McN couldn't tell this press, without  
admitting that earlier threat of "action"  
had been hollow, or thoughtless;

actual presence of SSMs was determined;  
one could point to only of  
"action" to do so before by arrival

(or threatening, coming out, retal  
or violence from elsewhere  
where SSMs were not threatened.)



9 Jul 89

My est. of risk is based on assumption  
that JFK would have carried out  
RFK warning of near shot  
~~before~~ warning, or after

at least against many SAMs, prob. SSMs

But what if he would not have?

It Mc6 would be close to right:  
risk was not as high as I thought

(though "that" point of nuclear reactors  
or nuclear war does not have to be  
high prob, to be intolerable.)

JFK did show one/he could refuse  
that "first drink," in the face of US  
commit units ~~at~~ <sup>engaged</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> Vietnam

(though: blockade + Berlin important  
neon (already there:  
not in combat)

- Not, ABJ, M  
bst
- Cuba I '61 like Carter, Iran; (ZCI)
  - Laos '62 bst, China, 1949
  - VN '61 Reagan: Nicaragua: Panama (not, Libya)
  - Cuba II (it appears): refusal to respond to U-2  
(and it appears, from new evidence)

Thus, Schles is wrong to say, "He did not resist  
that first drink" - Schles didn't know (?)  
what Taylor <sup>+ McN</sup> wanted...

in VN

Ruth: he kept bottle in the house;  
he was around drinking companies  
He fantasized; he was in the bar,  
singing drinking songs" in Cuba



McG r "safe" - because with control war.  
+ both controlled...

They did not control - vs. McG, p. 1  
in JFK

K did not control Castro  
and JFK was interpreting Castro's action as K's, <sup>challenge</sup>  
regarding a response as if it were K <sup>JFK</sup>

(as JFK/McN thought to do if a MRBM fired)

"We hold you responsible"

(If RPK had not wound K, it would have  
been in more danger - K just not have  
been down

when he realized JFK control  
was going, in which case RPK's warning didn't  
work; only his rejection of that method  
(with cult. making this bluff/rejection  
more credible)

(with rejection (RPK, scale)  
not cult.

were "sincere" threats  
with bluffs

(not, warning a man)

My Op-Ed says: What if K didn't back down promptly after 8 PM  
didn't rain: What " " " " " " after 8 AM, Sat.  
(He didn't; Day of Days)



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response on SAMs / laws to an AA attack  
— or sending recon (unless a hard bluff,  
w<sup>anting</sup> to demonstrate  
violence to K:')

if they had known Castro controlled.

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(1 excludes Mexico — France  
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de Gaulle, Algeria

Khrushchev, Africa

VN, in Cambodia

(Begin in Lebanon — under domestic pressure

(Rogers, Lebanon)

(Baker, AA OK)



Does the FU think <sup>land-based, in area</sup> from SNF by some additional deterrence, or "warfare"?

Yes (whereas a FU for offshore, against a very valued SU force, holding no!)  
that does not threaten "all Europe")

But at what cost / risk?

- (1) of servant; <sup>2</sup>/<sub>4</sub> UA;
- (3) and of loss of local command, Lf Command, or Pms, in circumstances that arise <sup>(4)</sup> (despite "deterrence, perhaps" "art of control" of Sows

— kill, Castro firing at AA

SAC - U-2

— JFK response to this, with pressure of JCS, his threat, his commitment, fear of independent

Alert in Cuban  
forcing who to surface  
Failure to get Turk  
missiles defended

— or, USAF response (as about happened on 27 Oct)

— see large number of low troops: if US invaded...  
— fear of Turk firing (by McN)

(Henderson vs. General Staff

— fear of low firing (by McN)

C<sup>3</sup> failure

"Mobe was war"

Mobe vs. Henny

Schliiff Plan

Bombing: of London!

of Rotterdam

of town in French border

Cf. XRL

CH: SU actually responding to count US  
plus, prep, exercises — of which most  
analysts were unaware!



## Draft Proposal

(me: "you are what you pretend to be...")

Preps are for Threat: bluff: "

But do they (not) create a world (both sides,  
in which some <sup>(other)</sup> leaders or subordinates will believe that it is  
"appropriate" to initiate:  
will have power to initiate, and

- with
- 1) misleading signals, or circumstances
  - 2) acting in uncertainty of " " "
  - 3) believing that planned responses to actual (or misperceived, or uncertain) circumstances are appropriate
  - 4) analogy with (3), <sup>as "precedent,"</sup> believing FC is approp. response to other circumstances.

War, & not war, is not desired <sup>by anyone</sup>; and not, in non-crisis conditions, "intended." Does that mean peace = 0?!

But initiate any change (though not "desired");  
to achieve a "lesser evil," desperately: or risk the big nuclear attack  
great defeat, humiliation  
(or other reason?)

Problem: There are those who see a possible advantage, fraction, purpose, or to be achieved by the launch of some nuclear weapons in some circumstances: this is not "unthinkable" to all, or a "pure bluff" in all eyes...

And the nature of weapons provided, and the balance, affects the perception: makes it more or less likely. There is a material basis, as well as psych. & doctrinal.



The risk is not "acceptable" (Stimson)  
despite its practical aims & effects;

It is higher than supposed; not  
diminishing; will not diminish with  
new efforts, concentrations  
(Zachary:?)

CTI can return!

(Naig, 1981: blockade

Libya/Syria

Iran/Iraq

Israeli threat in <sup>to SU/US</sup> 1973

Iran 1980

Proble. poses "mini-CTI's": <sup>to allow continued</sup>

- new states seek to extend umbrella

- new or new-old seek to improve balance,  
to bring: ask neighbors/real men  
to forestall

(see Israel attack a Iraq!)

- Needless means by leaders who fear  
humiliation

- Loss of control of subordinates, allies

[all esp. dangers in context of

- props + aims to limit danger/prompt/den

- fear of losing "ability" to do so by  
losing control, C<sup>3</sup> vulnerability

[if everyone relied on coercive strategies,  
like by SIOB-CS, less danger!]

[MY STRAT: VS. DECAP/SF/PREEMPTION

(Nife a SU, '78)